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PEOPLE V. DUBARRY – AN EXPLORATION INTO THE 
COMPLEXITIES OF CHARGING A DEFENDANT WITH BOTH 
INTENTIONAL MURDER AND DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
MURDER 
Arielle Montoro* 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
PEOPLE V. DUBARRY1 
(DECIDED APRIL 7, 2015) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the recent New York Court of Appeals case, People v. 
Dubarry, the court attempted to resolve an issue that was disputed 
among the Appellate Division Departments for many years.2  
Specifically, the court considered whether the trier of fact could 
convict a defendant for both intentional murder premised on the 
transferred intent theory and depraved indifference murder when the 
trial court submitted such charges in the conjunctive.3  The Court of 
Appeals previously rendered decisions on this same issue, but its 
ambiguous and fact-specific opinions led to differing interpretations 
and the Appellate Division split.4  The New York Court of Appeals 
 
*J.D. Candidate 2017, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. in Criminal 
Justice – Law Enforcement Technology, magna cum laude, Farmingdale State College, 
2012.  I would like to thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for her dedication and guidance not 
only on this note, but throughout my law school career.  I would also like to thank my 
editors, Julia Ansanelli and Rhona Mae Amorado, for their extraordinary input, patience, and 
assistance with my case note.  Additionally, I would love to thank my family and friends, 
especially my parents, for their unconditional love and support throughout law school. 
1 31 N.E.3d 86 (N.Y. 2015).  
2 See discussion infra Section V.  
3 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 93.  
4 For example, the Second Department held that the trier of fact could convict the 
defendant of both depraved indifference and intentional murder, while the Third Department 
held that the jury could not convict a defendant of both intentional and depraved indifference 
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attempted to resolve this issue in Dubarry when it held that the jury 
cannot convict a defendant of both depraved indifference and 
intentional murder for a single murder.5   
This note will provide an analytical review of Dubarry and 
further discuss how the Court of Appeals did not, in the long run, 
resolve the split among the Appellate Division Departments in New 
York.  Specifically, this note argues that the court should charge a 
defendant with multiple murder charges alternatively.  However, if 
the counts are non-murder counts, then it is possible for the court to 
charge the defendant with such charges conjunctively.  In Part II, this 
note will provide an overview of the Dubarry decision, including the 
relevant facts and the court’s discussion.  Part III will examine the 
transferred intent theory in detail.  In Part IV, this note will analyze 
the previous New York Court of Appeals cases, specifically People v. 
Gallagher6 and People v. Trappier,7 which discussed a similar issue 
that was set forth in Dubarry.  Part V will then examine the split 
among the Departments of the Appellate Division—specifically, the 
cases that discussed the issue presented in Dubarry, as well as the 
similarities and differences among the Appellate Division rulings.  
Also in Part V, this note will explore the impact of the Dubarry 
decision on the prior Appellate Division cases.  In Part VI, this note 
will consider the background for charging defendants with depraved 
indifference murder in New York.  Lastly, Part VII will analyze 
Dubarry’s impact on future cases.  
II.  DISCUSSION OF DUBARRY 
The facts in Dubarry were in dispute at the time of trial.  The 
State and the Defendant each presented its version of the story and 
the following sections will present both versions.  Additionally, the 
procedural history and the court’s analysis and holding are examined 
below.  
 
murder. See People v. Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d 57 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010); People v. 
Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d 331 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2010). 
5 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95. 
6 508 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1987). 
7 660 N.E.2d 1131 (N.Y. 1995).  
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A.  State’s Version of the Facts 
The State alleged that Herburtho Benjamin (“Codefendant”) 
and ten other men were in Brooklyn, New York, and approached a 
residential building while searching for someone who assaulted one 
of them.8  The men proceeded inside the lobby where they saw 
Darius Dubarry (“Defendant”), a member of a religious group known 
as the Lek Leh Israelites,9 who had just finished his Sabbath 
services.10  Once the Defendant walked past the group of men outside 
the building one of the men stated, “That’s him.”11  Some of the men 
testified that they saw the Defendant and the Codefendant “pull out 
guns and shoot at one another.”12  The State also obtained video 
footage from the building’s surveillance camera, which showed the 
shootout and the Defendant “extending his arm to fire a gun before he 
reentered the building.”13  The forensic evidence further established 
that the Defendant fired the bullet that killed the victim “who was 
uninvolved in the events and innocently standing a few buildings 
away from the shooting.”14 
Not long after the shooting, the Defendant left the crime 
scene, and about a week later, investigators found the Defendant in a 
hotel in the State of Georgia under an assumed name.15  The 
investigators obtained statements from the Defendant in which he 
explained that directly prior to the shooting, he was leaving his 
religious services.16  He stated that he saw the men in the lobby 
follow him outside the building where the Codefendant pointed a gun 
at him.17  The Defendant said he “heard a click, and then a shot[,]” 
 
8 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 89.  
9 This group is more commonly known as the “Black Israelites.” See Glenn Blain, State 
Court of Appeals Overturns Murder Conviction for Man Involved in Brooklyn Nurse’s Death 
from Gun Battle, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:30 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/court-appeals-overturns-murder-conviction-gun-
battle-article-1.2177113.  
10 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 89. 
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
14 Id.  The innocent victim was a thirty-five-year-old nurse and a mother of a nine-year old 
son. See Veronika Belenkaya, Tina Moore, & Bill Hutchinson, Son Grieves Over Death of 
Mother, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 18, 2007, 2:26 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/son-grieves-death-mother-article-1.274873.  
15 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 89.   
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
3
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which caused him to shoot back and run into the building.18  The 
State also obtained eyewitness testimony from one of the residents 
who lived in the building who stated he saw the Defendant fire first at 
the Codefendant.19 
B.  Defendant’s Version of the Facts 
At trial, the Defendant testified that the Codefendant was the 
initial shooter and “shot . . . for no apparent reason.”20  The 
Defendant testified that he had a gun in his possession because he 
was keeping it from a member of his congregation.21  According to 
the Defendant, this member showed the Defendant a gun and said he 
had to handle a situation.22  The Defendant told him to “chill out,” 
took the weapon, and said he would dispose of it later.23  
The Defendant then saw the men in the lobby and thought he 
recognized one of them as a resident of the building.24  The 
Defendant explained he was smoking a cigarette in front of the 
building when the ten men accompanying the Codefendant went 
outside.25  The Defendant turned to enter the building and heard 
someone say, “Move. Move. Move.”26  He turned again and saw the 
Codefendant “pointing a gun at him.”27  The Defendant alleged that 
he did not know who the Codefendant was, and that he “froze when 
he saw the gun.”28  The Defendant stated the Codefendant “pulled the 
trigger twice, but the gun failed to fire,” and when the Codefendant 
fired again, the Defendant fired multiple shots back.29  The Defendant 
claimed he never handled a gun previously and did not know where 
 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 89-90.  The witness testified during the grand jury proceeding, but not at trial. 
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 89-90.  This witness testified that he saw the Defendant fire the first 
shot at the Codefendant. Id.  The witness, however, refused to testify at trial because of his 
belief that the Defendant was behind alleged threats made against the witness’s family. Id.  
Following a hearing to determine whether the Defendant was responsible for such threats, 
the court held that the Defendant was not responsible for them. Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 90. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 91.  
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 91. 
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
4
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he placed the gun after the shooting.30  He stated he returned to his 
apartment, and two days later, went to Georgia out of fear.31  He 
believed all the men were gang members, and fleeing to Georgia 
would allow enough time for his family to find an attorney.32  
Additionally, he alleged that the police coerced him to make false 
statements.33 
C.  Procedural Background 
At the pre-charge conference, and while discussing the verdict 
sheet, the trial court noted that intentional murder and depraved 
indifference murder were separate and distinct crimes; thus, the jury 
would consider both charges together.34  Defense counsel argued that 
there was insufficient evidence to establish depraved indifference 
murder because the Defendant participated in mutual combat with the 
Codefendant.35   
Nevertheless, the court submitted both charges to the jury in 
the conjunctive, among other charges, with the intentional murder 
charge submitted on a transferred intent theory.36  The court 
 
30 Id.  
31 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 91.  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  While the physical act required for both intentional murder and depraved 
indifference murder is the same, the requisite mental state differs. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
125. 25(1) (McKinney 2016).  Both types of murder require the physical act of killing 
another person. Id. at 125.25(2).  However, while intentional murder requires the defendant 
to possess a mental state of intent to kill the victim, depraved indifference requires the 
defendant to recklessly engage in conduct that creates a grave risk of death and such death 
occurs because of the conduct. Id.  Depraved indifference is its own culpable mental state 
and exists when a defendant possesses “an utter disregard for the value of human life—a 
willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply does not care 
whether grievous harm results or not.” People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (N.Y. 
2006) (quoting People v. Suarez, 844 N.E.2d 721, 730 (N.Y. 2005) (internal quotations 
omitted)).  
35 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 91.  Mutual combat is defined as “[a] consensual fight on equal 
terms — arising from a moment of passion but not in self-defense — between two persons 
armed with deadly weapons.” Mutual Combat, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
The mutual combat aspect is relevant because if two defendants acted in mutual combat with 
each other, the court would reduce the murder charge to voluntary manslaughter, which is a 
lesser crime than murder.  Id. 
36 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 91.  Depraved indifference is defined in the New York Penal 
Law:  “A person is guilty of murder in the second degree [under depraved indifference] 
when . . . [u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he 
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and 
5
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instructed the jury to consider the depraved indifference murder 
charge, and irrespective of its determination on that count, to next 
consider whether the defendant committed intentional murder.37  
Thus, the court left open the possibility that the jury could convict the 
Defendant of two forms of murder, each of which requires a different 
mental state for the same single act of murder. 
Subsequently, the jury convicted the Defendant of multiple 
charges, including intentional and depraved indifference murder.38  
The Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division, Second 
Department, affirmed.39  The Second Department stated that, while 
the murder convictions were each based on different states of mind 
with regard to the different victims, there was “more than one 
potential victim[,]” which allowed the Defendant’s murder 
convictions to stand.40  Soon after, a New York Court of Appeals 
judge granted the Defendant leave to appeal.41   
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Defendant claimed 
that the trial court violated his constitutionally protected due process 
rights when it submitted the depraved indifference murder charge and 
the intentional murder charge based on a transferred intent theory 
conjunctively to the jury.42  The Defendant argued that “where the 
actual and intended victims are different,” a conviction of both 
intentional murder and depraved indifference murder “subjects him to 
multiple criminal liability for a single homicide.”43   
The State asserted that each murder count required different 
culpable mental states; thus, the court should affirm the convictions.44  
In support of its argument, the State explained that a conviction of 
intentional murder required the State to prove the Defendant’s intent 
 
thereby causes the death of another person . . . .” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 
2016) (emphasis added).  By contrast, a person is guilty of murder in the second degree 
under New York Penal Law when “he intends to cause the death of someone, and he causes 
the death of such person or third person under transferred intent.”  Id. at § 125.25(1) 
(emphasis added).  The transferred intent theory, therefore, allows the defendant to be 
criminally liable for his or her actions, even though the intended victim was not the person 
harmed. Id. 
37 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 91. 
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 92.  
42 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 92.  
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
6
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to cause the death of the intended victim (here, the Codefendant) 
beyond a reasonable doubt.45  In contrast, the conviction of depraved 
indifference murder required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
Defendant’s recklessness by creating a grave risk of death to the 
actual victim “under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference 
to human life, resulting in the victim’s death.”46 
D.  Court of Appeals Discussion in Dubarry 
The New York Court of Appeals, reversing the Second 
Department’s decision, held that it was improper for the court to 
submit the intentional murder and depraved indifference murder 
charges in the conjunctive, and therefore, the jury could not convict 
the Defendant of both depraved indifference and intentional murder.47  
The court agreed with the Defendant and determined that “on the 
facts of this case,” the State could not employ the theory of 
transferred intent to convict the Defendant twice for the killing of the 
same victim.48  
The Court of Appeals in Dubarry began its analysis by 
examining People v. Gallagher in which the court held that “in single 
homicide cases, intentional and depraved indifference murder counts 
must be submitted to the jury in the alternative.”49  The Gallagher 
court explained that an act is either intended or not intended by its 
actors; it cannot be both.50  The Dubarry court further discussed the 
transferred intent theory, explaining that a defendant can be 
responsible for the death of a person even if it was not the person the 
defendant intended to kill.51  The Dubarry court established that the 
holding in Gallagher equally applies when the State proceeds on a 
transferred intent theory.52  The court in Dubarry stated:  
Whether based on the defendant’s conscious objective 
towards the intended victim, or on a transferred intent 
theory directed at a different, and actual, victim, [the] 
 
45 Id. at 94.  
46 Id.  
47 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95.  
48 Id. at 92.  
49 Id.; see Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d 909. 
50 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 92 (quoting Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910).  
51 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 93.  
52 Id. at 94.  
7
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defendant’s conviction depends on a jury finding that 
[the] defendant harbored the requisite intentional 
mental state.  [The d]efendant cannot then also be 
guilty of the same murder premised on a depraved 
state of mind.53  
The court explained that whether the Defendant acted with intent to 
kill one victim or whether he acted with the intent, on the transferred 
intent theory, to kill a different victim had no effect on whether the 
jury could convict the defendant of both depraved indifference 
murder and intentional murder.54  In either case, the court stated the 
answer to such question was still no.55 
The Court of Appeals in Dubarry acknowledged that the State 
had two alternative means by which it could establish the 
Defendant’s state of mind: (1) by proving transferred intent or (2) by 
proving depraved indifference to human life.56  Further, the Dubarry 
court explained that the Defendant’s state of mind was for the jury to 
determine.57  However, the court stated that because recklessness is a 
culpable mens rea, different from the intentional murder mens rea, 
allowing both murder charges prevents the jury from determining the 
defendant’s state of mind at the time the act was committed.58 
In Dubarry, the State unsuccessfully argued that Gallagher 
did not apply because two outcomes could result to two different 
individuals––the actual and intended victims—and urged the court to 
rely on People v. Trappier.59  In Trappier, the Court of Appeals 
upheld a defendant’s conviction of attempted first-degree assault and 
first-degree reckless endangerment when the defendant fired multiple 
shots towards his intended victim.60  The Trappier court noted the 
defendant may have intended to cause serious physical injury, while 
also recklessly creating a grave risk that a more serious result, like 
death, could occur from his act.61  The court in Trappier held that 
 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. 
56 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 93. 
57 Id. at 94. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 94-95. 
61 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 94-95 (quoting Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1133).  
8
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“the separate mens rea of intent and recklessness are not mutually 
exclusive when applied to different outcomes.”62 
The Dubarry court distinguished the facts before it from those 
in Trappier, holding that while two different states of mind 
accompanied the murder counts, only one outcome resulted: the 
victim’s death.63  The Court of Appeals explained that the transferred 
intent theory has two components:64  First, “to establish an intentional 
conscious objective to cause the death of another[,]” and second, to 
establish that the “shooting resulted in death.”65  Therefore, the 
Dubarry court emphasized that under the transferred intent theory, it 
was crucial for the State to establish the intent to kill, and a resulting 
death which means that “the identity of the victim was irrelevant.”66  
The court ultimately concluded that the State focused too much on 
the identity of the intended victim, and not on the requisite mental 
state.67  Therefore, the State “ignore[d] the essence of intentional 
murder based on transferred intent.”68 
Thus, the Dubarry court ruled that Gallagher was the 
controlling precedent and explained that the Defendant could only be 
guilty of depraved indifference murder or intentional murder with the 
transferred intent theory.69  While the Court of Appeals held that 
Gallagher controlled, the court did not overrule Trappier, in which 
the court held that it could charge the defendant with both an 
intentional assault charge and a reckless assault charge in the 
conjunctive.70  Therefore, Trappier still remains good law today.  
However, it may be challenging for the Appellate Divisions to 
determine which rule of law applies because Gallagher and Trappier 
present different circumstances.  If there are two murder charges with 
different mens rea, should the court automatically charge those 
 
62 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95 (quoting Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
63 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Id.  While the court stated the State focused too much on the identity of the victim, the 
court did not give any guidance on what would have been appropriate. Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d 
at 95. 
68 Id. 
69 Id.  
70 Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132. 
9
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counts alternatively?  The answer is difficult to determine because of 
the lack of guidance by the Court of Appeals in Dubarry.  
III.  TRANSFERRED INTENT THEORY  
An examination of the transferred intent theory is crucial to 
understand the court’s reasoning in Dubarry.  Transferred intent is 
not applicable to increase criminal liability—that is, the defendant 
cannot be charged with transferred intent for the sole purpose of 
including additional criminal charges.71  In New York, “when the 
resulting death is of a third person who was not the defendant’s 
intended” target (the “intended victim”), the defendant can still be 
responsible for the unintended victim’s death (the “actual victim”) 
“as if the intended victim were killed.”72  The defendant’s intent to 
kill the intended victim will transfer to the actual victim, in turn 
establishing the intent element of intentional murder.73  To 
successfully prove intentional murder, the State must show that the 
defendant, “[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, . . . 
cause[d] the death of such person or of a third person . . . . “74  The 
actual victim’s identity is irrelevant, as long as “the requisite intent to 
kill is” sufficiently alleged and established, “and the death of” such 
person results.75 
The doctrine of transferred criminal intent exists to ensure the 
defendant “will be prosecuted for the crime he or she intended to 
commit even when, because of bad aim or some other ‘lucky 
mistake,’ the intended target was not the actual victim.”76  While 
transferred intent may be useful to convict a defendant of a crime, the 
theory is permissible only when, “without the doctrine, the defendant 
could not be convicted of the crime at issue because the mental and 
physical elements do not concur as to either the intended or actual 
victim.”77  Rather, the doctrine is meant to hold the defendant 
accountable for a crime he or she has committed when all the 
 
71 People v. Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d 910, 913 (N.Y. 1996). 
72 Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d at 913. 
73 Id.  
74 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 2016).  
75 35 N.Y. JUR. 2d Transferred Intent § 504, LexisNexis (database updated July 2016). 
76 Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d at 913 (citing People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1984)). 
77 Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d at 913 (citing Ford v. State, 625 A.2d 984, 998 (Md. 1993)).   
10
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elements of that crime have been met, absent the intended victim’s 
death (i.e., when the actual victim died instead).78 
IV.  PRIOR COURT OF APPEALS CASES ON THE ISSUE OF 
CHARGING INTENTIONAL AND DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
MURDER  
While Gallagher and Trappier both discussed the issue of 
whether a court can submit both an intentional murder and depraved 
indifference murder charge to the jury, these decisions did not 
provide a definitive direction to the Departments of the Appellate 
Division.79  Subsequently, the Departments adopted inconsistent 
interpretations, which will be discussed further in Part V.   
In 1987, the Court of Appeals in Gallagher held that the court 
can only charge the defendant with intentional murder and depraved 
indifference murder in the alternative.80  However, in Trappier, 
decided in 1995, the court held that it could charge the jury with both 
an intentional charge and a reckless charge in the conjunctive.81  The 
Court of Appeals in Dubarry may have distinguished Trappier 
because it was not a homicide case, but an assault case, and thus, 
each charge had a distinct outcome as compared to the other.82  
Nevertheless, the Appellate Division Departments never made such a 
distinction.  This section will discuss cases in which the Court of 
Appeals considered whether the court could charge a defendant with 
both intentional murder and depraved indifference murder. 
A.  People v. Gallagher  
People v. Gallagher was the leading precedent the Court of 
Appeals cited in Dubarry.83  In Gallagher, the court explained that it 
is up to the jury, not the court, to decide the defendant’s mental state; 
therefore, the court should submit the charges in the alternative to 
 
78 Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d at 913. 
79 See Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 909; Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1131. 
80 Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910.  
81 Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1133.  
82 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95. 
83 Id. at 94.  Dubarry adopted similar reasoning, as well as the same conclusion: that the 
court cannot submit intentional murder and depraved indifference charges in the conjunctive. 
Id. at 95. 
11
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enable the jury to properly determine the defendant’s mental state at 
the time of the crime.84   
In Gallagher, the court held that the jury could not convict the 
accused of both intentional murder and depraved indifference murder 
simultaneously; rather, the jury may convict him of one or the other.85  
The defendant was a veteran New York City Police Officer, who 
consumed large amounts of alcohol after an all-night celebration on 
St. Patrick’s Day.86  That night, the defendant shot and killed a fellow 
police officer, similar to how the victim was shot and killed in 
Dubarry.87  The defendant was charged with two different counts of 
murder in the second degree.88  The trial judge advised defense 
counsel that, in conjunction with the indictments of intentional 
murder and depraved mind murder, he also submitted additional 
charges for the jury to consider.89  Specifically, these charges were 
manslaughter in the first degree, as a lesser-included offense of 
intentional murder, and manslaughter in the second degree, as a 
lesser-included offense of depraved mind murder.90  Defense counsel 
opposed the additional charges, arguing that this would allow the jury 
to return two guilty verdicts for the same act with different requisite 
mental states, and therefore, the court should submit the charges in 
the alternative.91  The judge overruled defense counsel’s request, and 
the jury returned a guilty verdict for both intentional murder and 
manslaughter in the second degree, the former requiring an 
intentional state of mind, and the latter requiring a reckless state of 
 
84 Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910. 
85 Id. at 909.  Prior to 1998, depraved indifference murder was previously called depraved 
mind murder.  The elements of the crime remained the same; it was simply a name change. 
See Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 92 n.2.  
86 Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 909. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 909-10. 
89 Id. at 910. 
90 Id.  A lesser-included offense is a crime that contains similar “elements of a more 
serious crime and” is therefore committed when someone is accused of committing the more 
serious crime. Lesser-Included Offense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  A 
lesser-included offense is regarded as “the same offense as the greater offense.”  Id.  Thus, a 
conviction or acquittal of either offense prevents a trial for the other offense.  Id. 
91 Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910.  
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mind.92  The Appellate Division, Second Department upheld the trial 
court’s decision and an appeal ensued.93 
The New York Court of Appeals in Gallagher held that a 
defendant who intentionally shoots someone acts “with the conscious 
objective of bringing about that result . . . .”94  That same defendant 
cannot act with a conscious disregard that “a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that such a result will occur.”95  The Court of 
Appeals focused on the fact that the act (shooting) and the result 
(death of the victim) were the same for both crimes.96  In other words, 
the jury cannot convict the defendant of both intentional murder and 
depraved indifference murder because this would result in two 
murder convictions for one murder.97 
The Court of Appeals in Gallagher further explained that the 
Criminal Procedure Law provides that, if a defendant is indicted on 
two counts that conflict with one another, the court must submit at 
least one of those charges.98  However, the statute further provides 
that if the court decides to charge the two inconsistent counts, it must 
charge them in the alternative, which means the jury cannot find the 
defendant guilty on both counts.99  The Gallagher court emphasized 
that it was the jury’s responsibility to decide if the defendant 
possessed either mental state at the time of the event in question.100  
The court further explained that this rationale applies to lesser-
included offenses as well.101  The Gallagher court held that the 
defendant could not possess “more than one of the mental states on 
the kaleidoscope of culpable mental states . . . .”102  The court noted 
that because there was only one act (shooting), and one result (death), 
two convictions for one act could not be valid.103 
 
92 Id.; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(1) (McKinney 2016) (stating “[a] person is guilty of 
manslaughter in the second degree when: [h]e recklessly causes the death of another person 
. . . .”). 
93 Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910.  
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 Id. 
98 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.40(5) (McKinney 2016).  
99 Id.   
100 Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910.  
101 Id. at 911.  
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
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Gallagher is consistent with the Dubarry holding in that the 
defendant cannot be convicted of both intentional murder and 
depraved indifference,104 and the Court of Appeals in Dubarry simply 
reaffirmed its prior reasoning from Gallagher. 
B.  People v. Trappier 
A number of years later, in Trappier, the Court of Appeals 
held that the jury could convict a defendant for both attempted assault 
in the first degree (an intentional assault charge) and reckless 
endangerment (a reckless assault charge).105  In this case, a dispute 
arose between the defendant and a security guard.106  When the 
defendant chucked a bottle in the lobby of an apartment building, the 
security guard told the defendant to leave, to which the defendant 
responded, “I’ll be back.”107  The defendant later returned and fired 
three shots in the direction of the security guard.108  One bullet hit the 
security guard in the leg, and the other went right past his ears.109  
The State charged the defendant with attempted assault and reckless 
endangerment, among other charges.110  
The trial court in Trappier instructed the jury on attempted 
first-degree assault, which required proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant intended “to cause serious physical injury” to the 
security guard.111  On the other hand, reckless endangerment required 
the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
“recklessly created a grave risk of death to . . . [the security guard] 
under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human 
life.”112  Further, the court emphasized that someone “recklessly 
creates a grave risk of death to another person when he is aware of 
and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a 
grave risk of death will result.”113   
 
104 Id.   
105 Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132. 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132. 
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 1133 (emphasis added).  
113 Id.  
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The defendant in Trappier was convicted on both reckless 
endangerment and attempted assault counts.114  Defense counsel 
argued to the judge that the jury’s conviction meant that the 
defendant possessed both reckless and intentional mental states at the 
time of the alleged act, and such conviction was mistaken because the 
defendant could not have acted both intentionally and recklessly in 
regard to the same action.115  The judge rejected defense counsel’s 
theory that the states of mind were contradictory.116  However, the 
Appellate Division, First Department reversed the trial court’s 
decision, stating that the counts were legally inconsistent with each 
other.117  The case was further appealed to the New York Court of 
Appeals.118  
The Court of Appeals in Trappier stated that the court must 
examine whether the essential elements of each charge submitted 
contradict each other.119  The court further explored the relevance and 
impact of Gallagher, which was decided eight years before 
Trappier.120   
When applying the Gallagher reasoning to Trappier, the 
Court of Appeals acknowledged that the act (the shooting) was the 
same for the reckless endangerment count and the attempted assault 
count,121 but the similarities between Gallagher and Trappier ended 
there.  The Trappier court concluded that the attempted assault and 
reckless endangerment counts each required two different results.122  
The court reasoned that a defendant may intend one result to occur 
(serious physical injury), while “recklessly creating a grave risk that a 
different, more-serious result––death” occurs from such action.123  
The Trappier court explained that the defendant may have fired his 
weapon at the security guard harboring the intent to cause only 
serious physical injury.124  The court stated that the defendant, in 
firing his weapon, “simultaneously consciously disregarded a 
 
114 Id.  
115 Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1133. 
116 Id.  
117 Id.; see People v. Trappier, 616 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994).  
118 Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1133. 
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 Id. 
122 Id.  
123 Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1133. 
124 Id. at 1133-34. 
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substantial and unjustifiable risk that, by so doing, he would create a 
grave risk of a more severe outcome,” the security guard’s death.125  
Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals in Trappier reversed the 
First Department decision and held that a court can charge a 
defendant with both reckless and intentional charges when the 
defendant’s act produces two distinct results.126 
The Court of Appeals in Dubarry correctly distinguished its 
facts from those in Trappier.  Trappier did not involve a homicide, 
but first-degree assault and reckless endangerment.127  Therefore, the 
statutes required different mens rea and actus reus for attempted 
assault and reckless endangerment charges; the former mens rea 
requiring intent to cause serious physical injury and the latter 
requiring reckless creation of a grave risk of death.128  Even though 
the defendant may intend to cause serious physical injury and not 
death, intent to inflict injury can still cause a more serious risk of 
death.129  In Dubarry, by contrast, the depraved indifference and 
intentional murder charges both required the end result of death.130  
The Court of Appeals in Dubarry clarified that Gallagher and 
Trappier involved different situations; however, the court did not 
adequately differentiate these two cases.  
V.  APPELLATE DIVISION SPLIT 
In Gallagher and Trappier, the Court of Appeals discussed 
whether the court may charge a defendant with both intentional 
murder and depraved indifference murder.131  The court reached 
seemingly different conclusions, which resulted in a split among the 
four Departments of the Appellate Division.132  The First, Second, 
and Fourth Departments all concluded that a court may charge a 
defendant with both an intentional murder charge and a depraved 
indifference murder charge, while the Third Department concluded 
that a court can only charge a defendant with such crimes in the 
 
125 Id. at 1134.  
126 Id. at 1132.  
127 Id.  
128 Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132-33. 
129 Id. 
130 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 94. 
131 See Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132; Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 909. 
132 See discussion infra Section V.A.  
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alternative.133  Thus, a jury could convict different defendants 
committing the same crimes in the same state and under similar facts 
with one or two murder charges, depending upon the Department in 
which the case fell.  
A.  Appellate Division Departments that Charged 
Intentional Murder and Depraved Indifference 
Murder in the Conjunctive 
The First, Second, and Fourth Departments all held that a jury 
may convict a defendant of both a depraved indifference charge and 
intentional murder charge.134  The relevant decisions from each of 
these Departments are discussed below.  
1.  Appellate Division, First Department  
The consensus in the First Department was that the court can 
charge intentional murder and depraved indifference together.135  
However, the First Department did not elaborate beyond stating the 
holding. 
a.  People v. Page 
In People v. Page,136 the First Department affirmed a 
defendant’s convictions of both intentional murder under a 
transferred intent theory and depraved indifference murder.137  The 
defendant argued that the First Department should reverse these 
counts because they were not submitted to the jury as alternatives.138  
The court reasoned that because more than one potential victim was 
present at the time of the shooting, the jury could convict the 
defendant of both murder counts.139  Because it was possible the 
defendant possessed a different state of mind with respect to each 
 
133 Id.  
134 See discussion infra Section V. A.1-4.  
135 See People v. Page, 880 N.Y.S.2d 287 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2009); People v. 
Monserate, 682 N.Y.S.2d 25 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998). 
136 Page, 880 N.Y.S.2d 287.  The defendant in Page was convicted of two counts of 
murder in the second degree, among other charges. Id. at 288.  The court did not develop the 
facts any further.  
137 Id. at 289. 
138 Id.  
139 Id.  
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individual victim, the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction on 
both murder charges.140 
b.  People v. Monserate 
In People v. Monserate,141 the First Department affirmed that 
there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of intentional 
murder under the theory of transferred intent and depraved 
indifference murder.142  The First Department held that the trial court 
properly submitted the charges in the conjunctive rather than the 
alternative because “more than one mens rea could have existed 
simultaneously under the circumstances.”143  The court explained that 
the defendant acted intentionally with regard to his intended victim 
and caused the death of the actual victim, which satisfied the mens 
rea element of intentional murder under the doctrine of transferred 
intent.144  The First Department decided the defendant also acted with 
depraved indifference in regard to the general public, including the 
actual victim.145  For these reasons, the First Department affirmed the 
trial court’s decision.146   
2.  Appellate Division, Second Department  
The Second Department held that the trial court could submit 
to the jury a charge requiring an intentional mens rea and a charge 
requiring a reckless mens rea in the conjunctive.147  In People v. 
Douglas,148 the court reasoned that it could charge a defendant with 
reckless assault and intentional assault in the conjunctive because the 
defendant could act recklessly with respect to one victim while also 
acting intentionally with respect to another victim.149   
 
140 Page, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 289.  
141 682 N.Y.S.2d 25 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998).  The defendant in Monserate was 
convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree, among other charges. Id. at 26.  The 
court did not develop the facts any further.   
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Id.  
145 Monserate, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 26. 
146 Id. 
147 See Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d 57.  
148 901 N.Y.S.2d 57 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010). 
149 Id. at 61.  
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In Douglas, a van with tinted windows double-parked in a 
traffic lane in Brooklyn, New York on September 26, 2003.150  A 
family (the Williamses) was in the van sitting with the passenger side 
door open.151  The defendant started to back his vehicle into a parking 
spot next to the van when he rolled over a glass bottle and hit Ms. 
Williams with the flying glass from that bottle.152  Ms. Williams’s 
son and brother confronted the defendant to ask for an apology.153  
The defendant stepped out of his car, proceeded back in the vehicle, 
turned the car around, and parked across the street from the van.154  
He then exited his vehicle and ran across the street carrying a gun.155  
The defendant fired his gun at the Williamses’ vehicle.156  “The 
[defendant] pointed the gun through an open window and fired two 
more shots . . . .”157  A police officer arrived, and a police chase 
ensued, leading the police to catch the defendant.158 
The prosecution charged the defendant with two counts of 
assault in the first degree.159  The first count alleged that the 
defendant “intended to cause serious physical injury” to the victim 
with a deadly weapon.160  The second count alleged that the 
defendant “recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of 
death to” the victim.161  The jury convicted the defendant of depraved 
indifference reckless assault, but he later appealed, stating that he 
only acted intentionally towards Ms. Williams and her son.162  The 
defendant further argued that while the evidence could support a 
conviction of intentional assault under the transferred intent theory, it 
could not support a conviction of reckless assault.163 
The Douglas court stated, “[w]hether a criminal act is 
intentional or reckless depends upon the relationship between the 
perpetrator’s objective in committing the act and the result the act 
 
150 Id. at 59.  
151 Id.  
152 Id.  
153 Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d at 59. 
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d at 59. 
159 Id.  
160 Id.  
161 Id.  
162 Id.  
163 Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d at 59. 
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produces.”164  The court stated that “[o]rdinarily a defendant cannot 
be guilty of both the intentional and reckless assault of the same 
individual because a defendant cannot intend to cause serious 
physical injury to a person and at the same time consciously 
disregard a risk that he or she will succeed in doing so.”165  The 
Douglas court noted that if the defendant harmed the intended victim, 
created a grave risk to the intended victim’s life, was aware of such 
risk but disregarded it, and ultimately caused serious physical injury 
to the actual victim, that act constituted reckless assault.166  In other 
words, the defendant may act with intent directed at one person, 
while acting recklessly with respect to a different person.167  The 
court found that the defendant acted with specific intent to kill or 
injure his intended victims, and he “created a substantial, 
unjustifiable, and grave risk of death,” not only to the victim but also 
to the other occupants of the car.168  The court concluded that the 
evidence would have supported a conviction of intentional assault 
under the transferred intent theory and sufficiently supported a 
conviction of depraved indifference reckless assault.169 
3.  Appellate Division, Fourth Department  
The Fourth Department has likewise held that the court may 
charge a defendant with intentional murder and depraved indifference 
in the conjunctive, rather than in the alternative, adopting the same 
reasoning as the First and Second Departments. 
In People v. Henderson,170 the defendant appealed his murder 
convictions, alleging the State improperly charged him with both 
intentional murder and depraved indifference murder.171  The court 
held that the defendant “intend[ing] to murder one victim when he 
drove a vehicle into a crowd did not preclude a finding that he acted 
with depraved indifference with respect to the three other victims 
 
164 Id. at 60 (quoting People v. Atkinson, 799 N.Y.S.2d 125, 129 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 
2005) (internal quotations omitted)). 
165 Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (emphasis added).   
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 61. 
169 Id.  
170 911 N.Y.S.2d 521 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2010). 
171 Id. at 522.  
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. . . .”172  The court agreed with the First Department’s decision in 
Page, reasoning that because there was “more than one potential 
victim,” the defendant could possess different mental states with 
respect to each victim.173  Therefore, the jury could indeed convict 
the defendant of both depraved indifference and intentional 
murder.174 
B.  Appellate Division, Third Department: The Only 
Department that Charged Intentional Murder and 
Depraved Indifference Murder in the Alternative 
The Third Department is the only Department of the New 
York Appellate Division that held that in most cases, a court must 
submit an intentional murder and depraved indifference murder 
charge exclusively in the alternative.175  The court determined that the 
jury’s role is to decide which mens rea the defendant possessed at the 
time of the crime.176  Therefore, the jury cannot find that the 
defendant acted both intentionally and recklessly with respect to the 
same result. 
The Third Department in People v. Molina177 held that the 
trial court could submit an intentional murder charge and a depraved 
indifference charge only in the alternative.178  In Molina, the 
defendant and two other people, Ross and Knox, were at a nightclub 
in Elmira in July 2008.179  A dispute erupted between Ross and an 
additional group of men from South Carolina.180  Both groups went to 
an apartment complex where they met up with additional groups 
outside of the complex.181  One man saw the defendant pull out a gun 
and started to shoot.182  One bullet penetrated the apartment complex 
 
172 Id.  
173 Id. at 523.  
174 Id.  
175 See Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d 331. 
176 Id.  
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 336.  
179 Id. at 334. 
180 Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 334. 
181 Id. at 335.  
182 Id. 
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and struck Maurice Davis in the head while he was in his apartment, 
ultimately causing his death.183 
The State charged the defendant with two counts of murder in 
the second degree, and he was convicted of manslaughter in the first 
degree184 and depraved indifference murder.185  The defendant 
appealed to the Third Department, arguing that the trial court erred by 
not submitting the charges in the alternative.186  Agreeing with the 
defendant, the court reasoned that “[t]win-count indictments . . . 
charging both intentional homicide and depraved indifference murder 
. . . should be rare[, with t]win-count submissions to a jury, even 
rarer.”187  The court stated that when the State presents both murder 
counts to the court, the trial court “should presume that the 
defendant’s . . . [acts] fall[] only within one category of murder 
. . . .”188  
The Molina court held that while the defendant intended to 
kill at least one of the men from South Carolina, he accidentally 
killed Davis.189  The court explained that as a result, the defendant 
could be convicted of either intentional murder under the theory of 
transferred intent or depraved indifference murder by shooting into 
an occupied apartment building; however, the defendant may not be 
found guilty of both.190  Concluding otherwise, the court noted, 
would:   
take[] the issue of determining [the] defendant’s mens 
rea out of the hands of the jury, and invite[] the jury to 
simultaneously convict [the] defendant of killing 
Davis both intentionally and with a depraved mind, 
when it should have been instructed that it could find 
defendant guilty of either intentional murder or 
depraved indifference murder . . . .191  
 
183 Id.  
184 Manslaughter in the first degree is a lesser-included offense of intentional murder and 
thus also requires intent, while depraved indifference is not premised on the mens rea of 
intent. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 2016).  
185 Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 335. 
186 Id. at 336.  
187 Id. at 335 (quoting Suarez, 844 N.E.2d at 731 (internal quotations omitted)).  
188 Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 335. 
189 Id. at 336. 
190 Id. at 335. 
191 Id.  
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For these reasons, the court disagreed with the other three 
departments and held that the court could not submit the depraved 
indifference and intentional murder charges to the jury together.192 
C.  The Effect of Dubarry on Prior First, Second, and 
Fourth Department Cases 
The Dubarry court did not satisfactorily resolve the split 
among the Departments.  As discussed above, the First, Second, and 
Fourth Departments of the Appellate Division all held that a court 
may submit intentional murder and depraved indifference murder 
charges together for a single murder.  This rule conflicts with the 
Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Dubarry, rendering most cases 
that were decided in conflict with Dubarry no longer good law if the 
defendant’s action in the case resulted in a single murder.  Thus, for 
the future, it is questionable what attorneys at the Appellate Division 
level will argue.  For homicide charges, Dubarry seems clear: one 
victim and one murder results in the State’s charging two different 
murder charges in the alternative.  However, if the case is not a 
homicide and is instead an assault, analogous to Trappier, then it 
seems that as long as the actus reus was different (meaning two 
distinct results could occur), then the State may charge the defendant 
with the two different assault charges in the conjunctive.  However, 
this concept is problematic, especially when every case and set of 
facts are different.  Essentially, the State will take the Trappier side, 
and the defense will take the Gallagher/Dubarry approach.  It is 
challenging to take a cookie cutter approach, making it difficult not 
only for the Appellate Divisions to apply the law but also for the 
Court of Appeals. 
VI. THE INCONSISTENCY WHICH LED TO “TWIN-COUNT 
INDICTMENTS” IN THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 
Scholars and professionals, including judges, predicted that an 
issue would arise if courts allowed the State to charge defendants 
with both depraved indifference and intentional murder.193  It is likely 
 
192 Id. at 336.  
193 See Sweet v. Bennett, 353 F.3d 135, 143-48 (2d Cir. 2003) (Walker, J., concurring); 1 
N.Y. LAW OF DOM. VIO. Murder in the Second Degree, Depraved Indifference Murder § 
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that poor drafting of the statute by the New York Legislature 
contributed to this problem.194  The statutory elements of intentional 
murder are self-explanatory: a defendant must intend to cause a 
person’s death, and that death must occur.195  On the other hand, 
depraved indifference was not clearly defined in the statute, and was 
left up to the New York courts to decide.196  This section will discuss 
the different interpretations of depraved indifference murder, along 
with the profound effect of these varying interpretations on the 
criminal justice system. 
In New York, a person is guilty of depraved indifference 
murder when, “under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference 
to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave 
risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of 
another person.”197  From the 1880s to the 1980s, the New York 
Court of Appeals agreed that depraved indifference was a mental 
state distinct from the mental state of recklessness, even though 
recklessness was included in the definition of “depraved 
indifference.”198  
However, in People v. Register,199 the New York Court of 
Appeals held that depraved indifference was not a separate culpable 
mental state.200  The Court of Appeals stated that depraved 
indifference does not refer to either the actus reus or mens rea.201  The 
Register court stated that when the court previously held that 
depraved indifference murder was not a culpable mental state, it 
“objectively define[d] the circumstances which must exist to elevate 
a homicide from manslaughter to murder.”202 
In People v. Sanchez,203 the Court of Appeals applied the 
Register test, which resulted in a dissent by Judge Rosenblatt that 
 
2:77, Westlaw (3d ed. database updated Nov. 2016) [hereinafter Murder in the Second 
Degree]. 
194 Bennett, 353 F.3d at 144-45 (Walker, J., concurring).  
195 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 2016). 
196 See Feingold, 852 N.E.2d at 1164-65.  
197 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2016). 
198 See People v. Poplis, 281 N.E.2d 167 (N.Y. 1972); People v. Jernatowski, 144 N.E. 
497 (N.Y. 1924); Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120 (1854) (holding that recklessness and 
depraved indifference were distinct mental states). 
199 457 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1983).  
200 Id. at 708.  
201 Id.  
202 Id.  
203 777 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 2002).  
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heavily criticized this test.204  He stated, “In concluding that depraved 
indifference murder has a mens rea of ordinary recklessness, the 
[c]ourt in Register essentially took the ‘depraved’ out of depraved 
indifference, so that depraved indifference murder is virtually 
indistinguishable from reckless manslaughter.”205  Judge Rosenblatt 
argued that the broad definition of depraved indifference would lead 
courts to charge juries with both intentional murder and depraved 
indifference murder, leading depraved indifference murder to lose its 
true meaning.206  Later cases such as People v. Gonzalez207 carved out 
exceptions to the Register rule when differentiating between 
intentional and depraved indifference murder.208  In Gonzalez, the 
court held that when a defendant purposefully intends to kill 
someone, depraved indifference is not present.209  Thus, the Court of 
Appeals attempted to draw a line between conduct that evinced a 
depraved indifference to human life and conduct that was 
intentional.210 
Eventually, the Court of Appeals in People v. Feingold211 
expressly overruled Register and decided that depraved indifference 
murder was a culpable mental state and was not an objective set of 
circumstances.212  The court explained that “depraved indifference is 
best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life – a 
willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one 
simply doesn’t care whether grievous harm results or not.”213  With 
Feingold overruling Register, critics were hopeful that courts 
charging both murder counts would be a thing of the past.214  
Unfortunately, that is not true as demonstrated by this note.   
Throughout the Register period, judges reasoned that 
prosecutors were receiving an unfair advantage over defendants 
because they could attempt to obtain two convictions rather than 
 
204 Id. at 218 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).  
205 Id. at 227 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).  
206 Id. at 232-33 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). 
207 807 N.E.2d 273 (N.Y. 2004).  
208 Id. at 275-76.  
209 Id. at 276-77. 
210 Id.  
211 852 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 2006). 
212 Id. at 1169.  
213 Id. at 1168 (internal quotations omitted).  
214 See Murder in the Second Degree, supra note 193. 
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one.215  Judge Bellacosa in his dissent in People v. Roe216 correctly 
predicted that an increased number of prosecutors would charge a 
defendant with both depraved indifference and intentional murder.217  
Additionally, Judge Rosenblatt dissented from Sanchez expressing 
similar concerns: 
[D]epraved indifference murder counts have become 
routine escorts to intentional murder counts . . . . 
. . . .  
[T]he charge of depraved indifference murder, 
intended to be a rare indictment for a rare breed of 
criminal, has undeniably become a tactical weapon of 
choice that distorts the Penal Law and skews the 
process of indictment, trial and plea . . . . 218 
Judge Rosenblatt expressed concerns he and many other judges had 
in cases prior to Feingold.  While the majority in Feingold was 
probably hopeful for a change, as evidenced by Dubarry, defendants 
are still wrongfully charged with both intentional and depraved 
indifference murder.   
VII.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF DUBARRY  
The Court of Appeals in Dubarry attempted to resolve the 
split among the Appellate Division Departments on the issue of 
whether a court can charge a defendant with both intentional murder 
and depraved indifference murder for the same killing.  Prior to 
Dubarry, the First, Second, and Fourth Departments all agreed that 
the court could submit a murder charge requiring an intentional mens 
rea and a murder charge requiring a depraved indifference mens rea 
in the conjunctive.219  However, the Third Department disagreed, 
instead finding that courts can only submit these charges in the 
alternative.220  As the Third Department explained in Molina, a 
defendant cannot kill with both an intentional and a depraved 
indifference state of mind.221 
 
215 Id.  
216 542 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 1989).  
217 Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 619 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
218 Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 224 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). 
219 See discussion supra Section V. 
220 Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 336.  
221 Id. at 336.  
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The Court of Appeals in Dubarry agreed with the Third 
Department: the defendant can only possess either an intentional or a 
depraved indifference state of mind, but not both.222   The Dubarry 
court emphasized that submitting the charges in the conjunctive 
deprives the jury of its role in determining the defendant’s state of 
mind at the time the murder or act was committed.223  
The Dubarry holding is consistent with the dissents in 
Sanchez and Roe.224  However, Dubarry, Sanchez, and Roe all 
involved murder charges.225  Would it make a difference if the 
charges were assault charges?  The answer is likely yes, according to 
the Court of Appeals in Trappier, which held that the court can 
charge a defendant with both attempted assault and reckless 
endangerment.226  The Trappier court examined the mens rea and 
actus reus of the charges and concluded that each charge required a 
different result.227  In such a case, the defendant could intend to cause 
serious physical injury, while also recklessly causing a grave risk of 
death to another person.228  The Dubarry court came to the right 
decision and Trappier should not be overruled; however, the Dubarry 
court should have explained further how it came to its decision. 
Judges have pointed out that New York Court of Appeals 
cases wrongly focus on the act of the crime.229  However, it is hard to 
distinguish the results in a murder case from each other – can a 
defendant intend to kill someone while also recklessly causing his 
death?   
The fact-specific nature of the cases makes it extremely 
challenging to create a definite rule.  However, even in Dubarry, the 
Court of Appeals did not seem to resolve the Appellate Division split.  
Dubarry is just another decision specifically ruling on the facts of the 
case.  Defense counsel cannot guarantee to his client that a judge will 
not charge him with both intentional murder and depraved 
 
222 Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95. 
223 Id.  
224 See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text. 
225 See Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 89; Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 610; Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 204. 
226 Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132.  
227 Id. at 1132-34 (stating that reckless endangerment required the defendant to recklessly 
create a grave risk of death to another person under circumstances evincing a depraved 
indifference to human life, while attempted assault required the defendant to intend serious 
injury). 
228 Id.  
229 See Bennett, 353 F.3d at 143-48 (Walker, J., concurring). 
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indifference murder because it depends on how fact-specific the case 
is and what precedent the judge applies that day.  While the Dubarry 
court rightfully held that, on the facts of that case, a trial court cannot 
charge a defendant with both intentional and depraved indifference 
murder, the Dubarry court did not resolve the split among the 
Appellate Divisions and did not make it easier to resolve future cases 
before the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals should have 
explained the rationale for its holding and furnished an in-depth 
analysis as to the significance of the differences between Gallagher 
and Trappier.  This would have provided meaningful guidance not 
only to the Departments of the Appellate Division, but also to the 
trial courts.  
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